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Therefore, stock in a professional service corporation is subject to
levy and sale under judgment execution to the same extent as ordinary
corporate stock.2 ' However, the added feature of a possible forced dis-
solution may destroy an essential element for an organization to be taxed
as a corporation, that is, continuity of life, and result in Florida's pro-
fessional service corporations being taxed as partnerships.2 If this should
happen, the essential purpose of the statute-to give to professionals the
advantages of corporate tax treatment-would be destroyed.
WILLIAM L. SAX
REMOVAL DENIED: THE SURVIVAL OF THE VOLUNTARY-
INVOLUNTARY RULE
The plaintiff, a citizen of Mississippi, filed a suit in a Mississippi
state trial court against two defendants: one a New York corporation,'
and the other its employee, a resident of Mississippi. The court entered
a directed verdict in favor of the resident' defendant. The remaining non-
resident defendant immediately filed a petition for removal in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi contending
authorized stockholder would serve to preclude as a stockholder any person not a
professional within the meaning of the statute. This would be the case regardless of
the manner in which a nonprofessional happened to legally acquire shares of stock
in a professional service corporation.
Street v. Sugerman, 202 So.2d 749, 751 (Fla. 1967).
Even if Florida Statute § 621.10 was not to apply, the inconsistency between a non-
professional's holding of stock which only professionals may hold per Florida Statute
§ 621.09 would have to be resolved, and certainly not by avoiding the statute.
24. "Lands and tenements, goods and chattels, equities of redemption in real and per-
sonal property, and stock in corporations shall be subject to levy and sale under execution."
FLA. STAT. § 55.20 (1965) (emphasis supplied).
25. A professional service organization is treated as a corporation . . . only if it has
sufficient corporate characteristics to be classifiable as a corporation ... rather than
as a partnership or proprietorship.
Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(h) (1) (i) (1965).
There are a number of major characteristics ordinarily found in a pure corporation
which, taken together, distinguish it from other organizations. These are: (i)
Associates, (ii) an objective to carry on business and divide the gains therefrom,
(iii) continuity of life, (iv) centralization of management, (v) liability for corporate
debts limited to corporate property, and (vi) free transferability of interests. (em-
phasis supplied).
Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 (a) (1) (1960).
Since many of these characteristics are common to both a partnership and a corpora-
tion, only the strictly corporate characteristics are determinative. Therefore, each charac-
teristic is important in determining the status of a corporation for tax purposes, and lack of
one characteristic could be determinative of the question.
1. New York is Dreyfus' place of incorporation and also its principal place of business.
For both of these reasons, Dreyfus is a citizen of New York for the purposes of removal
under 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1964).
2. While we recognize that residency is not the equivalent of citizenship, hereinafter
defendants will frequently be designated either as "resident" or "nonresident".
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that the reference to an "order" in the 1949 amendment to the removal
statute3 should be read to include an order of a directed verdict. The
plaintiff's motion for removal from the state court was denied in accord-
ance with an earlier decision of the same district court.4 On appeal, the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the "volun-
tary-involuntary rule" survived this amendment and its application to
the facts of this case required that removal be denied because the plain-
tiff did not voluntarily dismiss the resident defendant. Weems v. Dreyfus
Corp., 380 F.2d 545 (5th Cir. 1967).
When the instant action was instituted in the state court it was not
removable to the federal court because of lack of complete diversity of
citizenship of the parties. Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution of the
United States declares that, "The judicial power shall extend to all cases
• . . between Citizens of different states. . . ." Under this constitutional
power, the Judiciary Act of 1789 granted diversity jurisdiction to the
federal courts.5 In Strawbridge v. Curtiss,' Chief Justice Marshall set
forth the rule of "complete diversity" which required that diversity of
citizenship must exist between all plaintiffs and all defendants. 7 Under this
rule a nonresident defendant is unable to remove a case in which a resi-
dent defendant is properly joined. However, if after the suit is commenced
the resident defendant is eliminated from the case, leaving only a non-
resident as defendant, the question arises whether at that point the case is
removable.
Until 1949 no statutory provisions dealt with the question of removal
after commencement of a suit. However, the case law developed the rule:
[T] hat if the resident defendant was dismissed from the case by
the voluntary act of the plaintiff, the case became removable, but
3. The petition for removal was filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (1964):
If the case stated by the initial pleading is not removable, a petition for removal
may be filed within twenty days after receipt by the defendant, through service or
otherwise, of a copy of an amended pleading, motion, order or other paper from
which it may first be ascertained that the case is one which is or has become re-
movable (emphasis added).
Title 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (1964) was amended in 1949 and in 1965. The 1965 amendment
extended the twenty day period to thirty days. Hereinafter reference to "the amendment"
will be to the 1949 Amendment.
4. Lyon v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 228 F. Supp. 810, 811 (S.D. Miss. 1964). In Lyon, the
court examined the 1949 amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) 1964 and stated:
[T]here is nothing in this statute from which it can be properly inferred that Con-
gress intended that a removal could be effected only in the event the plaintiff volun-
tarily did something which removed the local defendant from the case.
5. This has been changed and codified and today is contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1964).
28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1964) authorizes removal by a nonresident defendant in any civil action
brought in a state court where the federal district court would have had original jurisdiction
due to diversity of citizenship.
6. 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
7. "If there are several parties on one or both sides, there is no federal diversity juris-
diction if one of the parties on either side is a citizen of a state of which a party on the
other side is also a citizen." 1 BARRON & HoLTzorF 145 (1960).
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if the dismissal was the result of either the defendant's or the
court's acting against tlhe wish of the plaintiff, the case could not
be removed.8
The 1949 amendment to 28 U.S.C. 1446(b) (1964) did not track the
words of the rule. Notable in the change is the fact that the amendment
contains no mention of dismissal by the voluntary act of the plaintiff. The
amendment, on the other hand, simply states that the case is removable
upon receipt by the defendant of a copy of an amended pleading, motion,
order or other paper from which it may first be ascertained that the case
is removable. It was the phrase "order or other paper" which persuaded
the distict court in Lyon v. Illinois Cent. R.R. ° that removal was proper
after the involuntary dismissal of the resident defendant:
The plaintiff insists that the involuntary dismissal of the resi-
dent defendant does not remove him from the case but that con-
tention is untenable insofar as this proceeding is concerned....
There is nothing in this statute from which it can properly be
inferred that Congress intended that a removal could be effected
only in the event that the plaintiff voluntarily did something
which removed the local defendant from the case. The order of
the state court on the resident defendant's motion ... is surely
an order or other paper from which it may first be ascertained
that the case . . . has become removable ...
Something must be read into this statute which Congress
did not write into it before it can be said that a case can become
removable from a state court during the trial only in the event a
plaintiff voluntarily does something to extricate and completely
remove the resident defendant from the suit.
The Court of Appeals felt that the district court, in the instant case
as well as in Lyon, failed to take into account the legislative history of
the 1949 amendment and failed to read the amendment in light of the
previously developed case law. The legislative history stated that the
amendment was "declaratory of the existing rule laid down by the de-
cisions. (See for example Powers .... )11
The rule referred to in the legislative history is the voluntary-in-
voluntary rule that developed from the case, Powers v. Chesapeake & 0.
Ry."2 This decision emphasized the time element of the dismissal rather
8. Note, The Effect of Section 1446(b) on the Nonresident's Right to Remove, 115
U. PA. L. REV. 264, 267 (1966).
9. See note 3 Supra for full quotation of the 1949 amendment.
10. 228 F. Supp. 810, 811 (S.D. Miss. 1964).
11. 2 U.S. CODE CONG. SERV. 1268, 81 Cong., 1st Sess. (1949).
12. 169 U.S. 92, 101 (1898). Powers was an action against a nonresident railroad and
several of its resident employees. After the time period had elapsed, within which the peti-
tion for removal could be filed, the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the resident defendants.
Removal was then allowed.
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than the fact that the plaintiff voluntarily ditmissed the resident defend-
ant.
The result is that, when this plaintiff discontinued his action
against the individual [resident] defendants, the case for the
first time became such a one as, by the express terms of the
statute, the defendant railway company was entitled to remove;
and therefore its petition for removal, filed immediately upon
such discontinuance was filed in due time.
Nevertheless, in Whitcomb v. Smithson13 the fact that the resident
defendant was eliminated by the voluntary action of the plaintiff was
seized upon. Removal was denied because the resident defendant had
been eliminated by a directed verdict rather than the voluntary action
of the plaintiff. Two years later the Supreme Court again denied removal
in Kansas City Suburban Belt Ry. v. Herman14 and stated:
In Powers . . . . Plaintiff voluntarily discontinued his action
against the company's co-defendants .... In Whitcomb ....
Plaintiff did not discontinue his action against either of the de-
fendants and went to trial against both and the trial court di-
rected a verdict in favor of one of them. The ruling was on the
merits and in invitum.
The above decisions were shaped into a rule of law in American
Car & Foundry Co. v. Kettelhake.15 This rule was followed by the fed-
eral courts until the 1949 Amendment but not without comment. In an
article prior to the amendment the voluntary-involuntary dichotomy was
questioned:
This re-examination of the cases suggests that the right of re-
moval after the time for the defendant's answer should depend
on the effective severence of the resident defendants from the
action. Such a test is supported by the never-overruled ... case
of Yulee v. Vose .... 16
It appears that the case law rule overlooked Yulee v. Vose,'17 a de-
cision 20 years prior to Powers. In Yulee the court held that it was error
for the state court to deny removal after the resident defendants had
been dismissed from the action by the court. This would raise a question
13. 175 U.S. 635 (1900).
14. 187 U.S. 63, 69-70 (1902).
15. 236 U.S. 311, 316 (1915) ; the Supreme Court stated:
Taking these cases together, we think it fairly appears from them that where there
is a joint cause of action against defendants resident of the same State with the
plaintiff and a non resident defendant, it must appear to make the case a removable
one as to a nonresident defendant because of dismissal as to resident defendants that
the discontinuance as to such defendants was voluntary on the part of the plain-
tiff ....
16. Note, Removal of Suits to Federal Courts Alter the Statutory Deadline: An Old
Formula Re-Examined, 60 Haav. L. REV. 959, 962 (1947).
17. 99 U.S. 539 (1878).
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in the instant case since the Court of Appeals relied on the statement in
the legislative history of the 1949 amendment that it was declaratory of
the existing rule laid down by the decisions. Apparently the Yulee deci-
sion was not considered, particularly in Whitcomb which was the first
case to deny removal because the resident defendant was not removed
by the voluntary action of the plaintiff but rather by a court order.
Since 1949 it has been questioned whether the voluntary-involuntary
rule survived the amendment. However, a majority of the federal district
courts have continued to follow the voluntary-involuntary rule. In
Squibb-Mathieson International Corp. v. St. Paul Mercury Insurance
Co., 8 the nonresident defendant claimed that the rule was changed by
the 1949 amendment and that the case was removable when the resident
co-defendent was involuntarily dismissed as long as an order of dismissal
was entered. The court said the weight of authority since the 1949 amend-
ment was contra and pointed out that the former distinction had merit,
in that it prevented removal where the nonresident defendant was elimi-
nated by a court order which might be subject to reversal on appeal.
One authority, 9 commenting on this problem, did specifically ques-
tion whether the voluntary-involuntary rule survived the 1949 amend-
ment. This commentator stated that it would appear to be no longer
settled that a case was not removable if the non-resident defendant was
eliminated from the case by a directed verdict. The comment was quoted
and used as a basis of the decisions in Lyon.
The instant case is the first time the question of the survival of the
voluntary-involuntary rule has been passed upon by a United States
Court of Appeals since the 1949 amendment. It seems unfortunate that
the court did not take a bold step and depart from the majority of dis-
trict courts that have continued to follow the case law rule. The principal
argument expressed in favor of the case law rule is the one "danger of
appellate reversal" noted in Squibb-Mathieson. On the other hand, it may
be argued that if Yulee is taken into consideration, the voluntary-involun-
tary rule is not declaratory of the rule laid down by decisions.
The situation presented in the instant case is an example of the re-
sults produced by the rule. Why should the defendant New York Cor-
poration be denied removal to the federal courts because the resident
defendant was eliminated by court order? The parties were then in com-
plete diversity and the case should be removable.
It is submitted that the present rule lends itself to the possibility of
sham joinder. It is obvious that if a plaintiff does not wish to have the
case removed to the federal court by the nonresident defendant he cer-
18. 238 F. Supp. 598 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
19. 1 BARRON & HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACtICE AND PRoCEDU E 474 (1960)
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tainly is not going to voluntarily dismiss his action against the resident
defendant. As pointed out in an article mentioned earlier, 20 a better test
is needed. As long as diversity jurisdiction is continued there is no reason
to impose such an artificial test as the voluntary-involuntary rule upon a
nonresident defendant who may wish to remove to a federal court.
EDwARD J. WALDRON
20. Supra note 16.
